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Global Networks and International Environmental
Lawmaking: A Discourse Approach
Asher Alkoby*
I. THE RISE OF GLOBAL NETWORKS
The concept of "networks" is gaining currency in the study of global
politics and international law. The term usually refers to a loose organization of
nonstate actors characterized by "voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns
of communication and exchange."' A network operating globally may include
individuals (activists, scientists, or government actors), nongovernmental
organizations ("NGOs"), social movements, and intergovernmental
organizations ("IGOs"). Network members interact with each other, with states,
and with other IGOs to promote their political agendas both within and outside
institutions of global governance. Much of this network activity takes place
outside of state and intergovernmental structures. There are an increasing
number of international environmental standard-setting initiatives taken without
any participation on the part of the state, much less state primacy.' The focus of
this Article, however, is the direct and indirect participation of global networks
in international environmental decisionmaking fora, as a matter of both practice
and aspiration. The discussion below is limited to two forms of networks
involved in international environmental lawmaking, in which NGOs are key
* Assistant Professor, Ted Rogers School of Management, Ryerson University. Many thanks to
Jutta Brunne, Cameron Hutchinson, Sarah Amato, Lisa Forman, and the CJIL staff and editorial
board for their useful comments and suggestions. I also thank Rose Anderson for her research
assistance.
1 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocagy Networks in International
Politics 8 (Cornell 1998).
2 Examples include the United Nations Global Compact, the World Commission on Dams, the
Forest Stewardship Council, and the International Organization for Standardization. These have
been termed "Global Public Policy Networks" by Reinicke and Deng. Wolfgang H. Reinicke and
Francis Deng, Critical Choices: The United Nations, Networks, and the Future of Global Governance 1 (Intl
Dev Rsrch Ctr 2000). For an extended discussion, see Matthew J. Hirschland, Corporate Social
Responsibilioy and the Shaping of Global Public Poliy (Palgrave 2006).
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members-networks of environmental nongovernmental organizations
("ENGOs") and business and industry nongovernmental organizations
("BINGOs").
The rise of global networks is closely linked to the "democratic deficit"' in
global governance because individuals and private organizations increasingly
perceive themselves as excluded from policy decisionmaking that affects their
interests. This participatory gap in global governance stands at the center of
much scholarly debate across disciplines. It is often claimed that the involvement
of global networks in international lawmaking improves the democratic quality
of political arrangements because it gives people more control over the ways
their lives will be governed-something that nondemocratic governments refuse
to provide and democratic governments are increasingly unable to provide.
4
In attempting to explain the motivation for global network activity,
international relations scholars have looked at the domestic opportunity
structure and its impact on transnational activism, or, in other words, the local
institutional conditions under which network members operate and the
network's points of access to the domestic political system. These scholars have
documented how domestic groups in repressive regimes try to bypass their
governments and to seek allies to bring pressure on their governments from the
outside by linking with international NGOs and transnational networks of
activists.' In repressive regimes, the lack of domestic political opportunity to
influence policymaking is what brings collective actors to seek allies
transnationally. Their allies in democratic regimes cooperate with them in an
effort to bring about change in the repressive target-state by coercive means
(mostly through tactics of public shaming and economic pressure). But this still
does not explain what motivates nonstate actors in democracies to initiate
collective action. If the domestic political opportunity exists, as it does in
democracies, and domestic actors can find channels of influence in their own
countries, why would they resort to transnational action and act through global
networks?
A possible answer is that easy access to the political system might be a
precondition to, but does not guarantee, policy outcomes. And so when local
NGOs in democracies find it difficult to reach the desired policy changes
See Daniel Bodansky, The Legiimay of Internalional Governance: A Coming Challenge for International
Environmental Law, 93 Am J Intl L 596, 597-99 (1999).
4 Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global People's Assemby: Legifimay and the
Power of Popular Sovereignty, 36 Stan J Intl L 191, 192 (2000).
5 See Keck and Sikldnk, Activists Beyond Borders at 12-13 (cited in note 1). See generally Thomas
Risse, et al, eds, The Power of Human Rights: Internalional Norms and Domeslic Change (Cambridge
1999).
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domestically, they seek global channels of influence to achieve their goals. A
related explanation, which stands at the center of international law discourse on
public participation, concerns the consequences of globalization on the national
policymaking capacity of democratic governments.6 International lawyers have
identified a growing shift in the decisionmaking authority from states to
international institutions, which creates a "democratic deficit" in international
law. In national democracies, the justification of the government's authority
derives from the participation of citizens in the decisionmaking processes.
Citizens may hold governments accountable for their actions through elections,
and the political process allows for pathways of public participation and ensures
transparency. But these domestic channels of influence have decreasing
relevance, since many decisions that directly impact the lives of citizens in
national democracies are being made at the global level, in international
institutions that were formed by governments.
Justification for authority of international norms and institutions was
traditionally based on state consent-both to specific commitments made by
states in international agreements and to the delegation of authority to
international institutions. But the legitimating force of state consent is being
increasingly diminished, especially in the context of environmental governance,
where there is a growing need for the development of lawmaking procedures
that do not depend on consensual decisionmaking' Furthermore, the rules that
such institutions produce are no longer aimed at states alone. Nonstate actors
are increasingly targeted or affected by global institutions of environmental
governance. Such actors have no choice but to act transnationally in order to
influence policy outcomes.
For these reasons, many international law scholars view the growing
involvement of activist networks in global politics favorably.8 The way to
address the democratic deficit, they argue, is to allow for participation of
individuals and groups in international policymaking. An increased involvement
of the interested public in global governance would contribute to the popular
legitimacy of international institutions and, as a result, advance their
effectiveness.
6 For an extended review of this literature, see Asher Alkoby, Non-State Actors and the Legiimagy of
InternationalEnvironmental Law, 3 Non-State Actors & Ind L 23 (2003).
7 Daniel Bodansky, Legilimay, in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunn&, and Ellen Hey, eds, The Oxford
Handbook of International Environmental Law 704, 712-14 (Oxford 2007).
8 See, for example, Kal Raustiala, The 'Particdpatogy Revolution"in International Environmental Law, 21
Harv Envir L Rev 537, 585-86 (1997); Peter J. Spiro, New Global Communiies: Nongovernmental
OrganiZations in International Decisionmaking Institutions, 18 Wash Q 45, 51 (1995).
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While in agreement with the view that global networks improve the
democratic quality of international institutions, this Article advances a particular
conception of democratic governance, one that is more useful for understanding
the role of networks in international rule creation and enforcement, as well as
for assessing their operational effectiveness. Under the proposed discourse
approach, the essence of democracy is deliberation rather than voting,
preference aggregation, or self-government. The interaction of civil society in
the public sphere, the realm of network activity, is likely to produce norms that
will be legitimate in the eyes of their addressees because such interaction is
typically nonhierarchical and unconstrained by power imbalances. The
institutional discursive framework, in turn, is where the communicative appeal
of the ideas that networks seek to advance can be tested. In the area of
international environmental governance, much of this discursive activity takes
place within intergovernmental institutions, which have been gradually opening
up to the input provided by networks of nonstate actors.
The Article's discussion begins in Section II by outlining the discourse
approach and explaining why it is arguably superior to the alternatives, especially
in the global context where preference aggregation is not a viable option. Section
III then turns to examine the involvement of ENGO and BINGO networks in
the climate debate, demonstrating how patterns of discursive interaction may be
observed both within each network and in the ways in which these networks
attempt to channel their respective agendas into the institutional deliberation. In
Section IV, this Article argues that the proposed conceptual schema is also
useful in responding to commentators who are critical of global networks'
involvement in environmental lawmaking. These critics claim that global
networks are not legitimate international actors because they answer to no one in
their power wielding political activity. Under a discourse approach, the
legitimacy of networks-both environmental and business-lies in their ability
to infuse the institutional debate with different policy perspectives and
arguments, out of which well-informed, consensual decisions may be reached.
The Article concludes by pointing to some of the implications flowing from a
discourse approach for institutional design.
II. THE LEGITIMATING FUNCTION OF NETWORKS: A
DISCOURSE APPROACH
A. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: RETHINKING DEMOCRACY
Theories on democracy have traditionally assumed a "spatial congruence"
between rulers (the nation-state) and subjects (the national society), namely, the
Vol 8 No. 2
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space where a community resides marked the political boundaries of that
community.' But this assumption becomes problematic as soon as we begin to
consider expanding political communities beyond national borders. A common
argument is made that "beyond the nation-state, the political prerequisite for a
democratic political community-the political space-is missing,"11 and, thus, in
the absence of an international political authority, stretching the reach of
democracy to the global (or regional) level is not a possibility."
Against this skeptical view stand two types of proposals for democratizing
global governance. The first solution, most associated in international law
literature with Thomas M. Franck, centers on the right to democratic
government as the basis for legitimacy in international law. 2 The way to
democratize the international system, Franck maintains, is by ensuring that those
who speak in global discourse themselves represent democratically elected
governments. While widely influential, this approach rightly attracted much
criticism on several grounds. This two-level solution overlooks the fact that
some countries are only democratic by name and that democracy, however
understood, is far from being truly entrenched in their political cultures. For
some cultures, notions of electoral democracy are alien, but other forms of
political participation may be found there. 3 Furthermore, to trust the
legitimating effect of this two-level discourse is to suggest, counterintuitively,
that the cure for the democratic deficit in the international system is simply to
ignore it. If the consent of the governed in representative democracies is
sufficient for legitimating the international norms created by those governments,
why do individuals feel the need to become involved in global politics? The fact
that the largest numbers of international NGOs come from liberal democratic
states suggests that a legitimacy deficit in international law exists even when
those who speak in the global discourse represent democratically elected
governments.
9 Michael Ziirn, From Interdependence to Globalization, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A.
Simmons, eds, Handbook of International Relations 235, 244 (Sage 2002).
10 Id at 245.
11 Two examples for this critique are Claus Offe, The Democratic Welfare State in an Integrating Europe, in
Michael T. Greven and Louis W. Pauly, eds, Democray Beyond the State: The European Dilemma and
the Emeging Global Order 63 (Rowman & Littlefield 2000), and Robert Dahl, Can International
Organizations be Denmocratic? A Skeptic's View, in Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon, eds,
Democraq's Edges (Cambridge 1999).
12 See Thomas M. Franck, The Emeging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 Am J Ind L 46 (1992).
13 See Gerry J. Simpson, Imagined Consent: Democratic Liberalism in International Legal Theory, 15 Aus YB
Ind L 103, 123-24 (1994).
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Other scholars advance arguments for some form of cosmopolitanism
embodied in institutional arrangements resembling a world government. 14 But
these proposals to extend democracy to the global level are typically presented as
an extension of liberal democracies, and a global democracy is imagined that
"results from, and only from, a nucleus, or cluster, of democratic states and
societies."'" Setting aside the objections such proposals raise at the normative
level, particularly the difficulties with imagining global democracies,
cosmopolitan arrangements are not politically feasible in the short- or medium-
term. Even the existing international institutions, which arguably form the basis
for a future world government, are not especially democratic today and are not
likely to be so in the foreseeable future.
Given the lack of prospects for radical cosmopolitan reform, scholars have
turned to elements of democratic theory that are said to enhance the legitimacy
of global institutions: accountability, transparency, and access to justice." The
meaning of these concepts and the purpose that they serve, however, continue
to be constrained by an understanding of "democracy" as a mechanism for
aggregating preferences. True and meaningful participation in democracies, it is
argued, is made possible mainly through the ballot box. Since that is not
available globally, any alternative form of participation can only result in a partial
and diffuse influence on the rulemaking process. Therefore, while public
participation by itself "is not sufficient to legitimate an institution, it may be
necessary to avoid concerns about legitimacy.' ' 17 When democracy is thus
understood as representation, the involvement of nonstate groups in
policymaking is rightly scrutinized since these networks of NGOs do not
represent the "public" in any meaningful sense: they are elected by no one. 1
But this conception of democracy implies that representation, mostly
through voting, is the most important channel of influence on policy formation.
Elections, however, provide a very thin form of political influence. They often
do not serve as a mechanism for creating political balance, but rather as markers
of the prevailing balance. 9 In the past two decades, some democratic theorists
have been advancing an alternative conception of democratic legitimacy that
rests not only on representation, but deliberation. Two streams of thought may
14 See, for example, David Held, Democrag and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan
Governance (Polity 1995). See also Falk and Strauss, 36 StanJ Ind L 191 (cited in note 4).
15 Held, Democray at 22 (cited in note 14).
16 Jonas Ebbesson, Public Partidpation, in Bodansky, Brunnbe and Hey, eds, Handbook 681 (cited in
note 7).
17 Bodansky, Legitimafy at 717 (cited in note 7).
'8 I will address this critique in Section IV below.
19 John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democrat7 and Beyond: Liberals, Ctilics, Contestations 25-27 (Oxford 2000).
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be identified in the deliberative turn in democratic theory: the liberal and the
critical. Both advance the claim that the essence of democracy should be
deliberation rather than voting, preferences aggregation, or even the idea of self-
government. The liberal strand considers the representative institutions and legal
systems of liberal democratic states (for example, parliaments and courts) as the
primary locus of political deliberation. a Critical theorists, on the other hand, put
more emphasis on informal discursive forms of deliberation and consider civil
society and the public sphere to be the primary sources of democratic
transformation and renewal. 1
For liberal deliberative democrats, institutional fora of liberal democracy
are where deliberation ought to take place: they are where participants aim to
persuade one another of the rightness of their positions. These theorists typically
do not engage directly with the separate role of civil society in the process of
structured deliberation, although they do emphasize the importance of the
publicity of the political debate. By contrast, in critical theories of deliberative
democracy, civil society plays a predominant role.22 Critical theorists understand
civil society as a tool for achieving radical political projects. They remind us that
profound changes in public policies in western democracies in the past few
decades were not the result of electoral decisions, but the outcome of collective
efforts of numerous individuals engaged in all kinds of communication directed
at the state. The civil rights movement in the United States, the international
women's rights movement and the environmental movement are three notable
examples .23
20 See, for example, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democrag and Disagreement (Belknap
1996). There is also a growing interest among legal scholars in deliberative constitutionalism. See,
for example, Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Harvard 1993). For a discussion of the
empirical aspects of deliberation in formal arenas, see Andr6 B~ichtiger and Jiirg Steiner,
Introduction, 40 Acta Politica 153 (2005).
21 Dryzek, Deliberative Democray and Beyond (cited in note 19).
22 See Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Sodeo and Political Theoy (MIT 1992). For a critical
adoption of their model in the context of global environmental governance, see Asher Alkoby,
Globalisng a Green Civil Soceo: In Search of Conceptual Clariy, in Gerd Winter, ed, Multilevel Governance
of GlobalEnvironmental Change 106 (Cambridge 2006).
23 For a discussion of the civil rights movement, see Dryzek, Deliberative Democrag and Beyond at 51-
52 (cited in note 19). For a discussion of the evolution of the women's rights movement
(particularly the right to formal political participation), see Martha Finnemore and Kathryn
Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 Intl Org 887, 894-896 (1998). For the
argument that based on the experience in domestic contexts radical shifts in environmental
conservation may only be achieved through "green agitation" driven by mass publics, see John S.
Dryzek, Resistance is Feile, 1 Global Envir Pol 11, 13-14 (2001).
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B. DISCOURSE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
In the study of global governance, deliberative models of legitimation are-
often based on Habermas's theory of communicative action.' 4 Early in his
writings, Habermas developed the concept of the "public sphere" as a discursive
space, seen as separate from the economy and the state, where citizens
participate and act through dialogue and deliberation.2' The discursive aspects of
this public sphere later served as a basis for his theory of deliberative
democracy.26 The notion of discourse builds on the need to allow participants in
political deliberation to account for their beliefs and actions in terms that would
be intelligible to others, who may accept or contest them.27 Principles, norms, or
any institutional arrangement can be said to be valid only if they meet the
approval of those affected by them. 28 Discourse theory rejects the vision of
democracy as an agglomeration of private preferences, and instead introduces
the notion of "institutionalized discourses" as the processes through which
political consensus is formed. Legitimacy, under this view, requires that
decisions rest on "good arguments" made by participants in the debate. It
derives from a mutual respect for the rules of argumentation: that participants
must be free and equal actors who challenge the validity of each other's claims,
that they seek a reasoned consensus about their situation and justifications for
the norms chosen, and that they are open to being persuaded by the better
argument.
29
To say that all participants are equal is to imply that relations of power
recede in the background, and it is only the power of the better argument that
must persuade all participants in the debate. The assumption is that principles,
24 Jdirgen Habermas, 1 & 2 Theogy of Communicative Action (Beacon 1981 & Beacon 1987) (Thomas
McCarthy, trans). For an extension of this theory to international relations, see Thomas Risse,
Let's Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics, 54 Intl Org 1 (2000).
25 Jurgen Habermas, Structural Tranformation of the Public Sphere (MIT 1989) (Thomas Burger, trans).
In this book, Habermas provided an historical account of the emergence of the public sphere in
eighteenth-century Europe in the form of private clubs, coffee houses, learned societies and
literary associations, journals, and newspapers. While historically much of the described activity
took place in physical spaces, the concept is defined in analytical terms and relates to a "sphere"
(which, as described below, is any realm of uncoerced conversation oriented toward a pragmatic
agreement), rather than a "place." With the advance of communication technology, the
interaction in the public sphere is increasingly conducted through electronic media.
26 Jiirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democray
275 (MIT 1996).
27 Habermas, Structural Transformation at 99 (cited in note 25).
28 Id at 82.
29 See the recent restatement of the rules of argumentation, as applied to the international realm, in
Andrew Linklater, Dialogic Politics and the Citilising Process, 31 Rev Intl Stud 141, 143 (2005).
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norms, or any institutional arrangement can be said to be valid only if it meets
the approval of all those affected by it. Therefore, the legitimating appeal of
norms is derived not mainly from the fact that they were created by elected
representatives, but because they were produced in an inclusive lawmaking
process absent domination.
How can such discourse be practiced in actuality? The first principle of
discursive argumentation, as noted above, is inclusiveness-all those who may
be affected by the outcomes of the discourse should be allowed to take part in it.
In addition to inclusiveness, participants should accept several preconditions
before entering the discourse that could assure the development of legitimate
norms:
First, they should enter dialogue convinced that no-one can know who will
learn from whom. Second, they should strive to reach agreements which
rely on the force of the better argument and which try to reduce overt and
subtle forms of power. Third, they should think from the standpoint of
others and aim to agree on universalisable principles which bind all together
as moral agents.30
These procedures aim to ensure that just outcomes will be reached. They
perform a critical function by way of filtering out arguments that are
unsubstantiated, unconvincing or self-serving, and they help to make a
distinction between better and worse claims. Agreements that are reached are
"right" because they are supported by good reasons.3
When theorizing the possible loci of discursive activities, Habermasians
make a distinction between "strong publics," formally organized institutions of
the political system, and "weak publics," the informally organized public sphere
located within civil society, which includes, among others, voluntary associations
and the mass media. The realm of "weak publics" is where social problems are
identified, interpreted, and resolved. They are then further filtered through the
Habermasian "system," the political discourse that assumes the decisionmaking
responsibility and addresses these problems at the level of policy change.32 The
challenge, Habermas himself maintained, is how to design "institutions of
political will-formation so that they reflect the more complex preference
structure of individuals rather than simply register the actual preferences that
individuals have at any given time.
33
30 Id at 142.
31 Risse, 54 Intl Org 1 at 10 (cited in note 24).
32 Kenneth Baynes, A Critical Theogy Perspective on Civil Sodey and the State, in Nancy L. Rosenblum
and Robert C. Post, eds, Civil Sodety and Government 123, 125 (Princeton 2002).
33 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms at 275 (cited in note 26).
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When mapped onto the international relations realm, this conceptual
schema suggests that the public sphere is where informally organized global
networks create and legitimate norms through discourse. In the political sphere,
networks act strategically in order to gain recognition, achieve benefits, and
influence the political discourse. This offensive, political mode of action is not
all about material gains; it also involves "the politics of influence," targeting
political actors and making them more receptive to the needs and self-
understandings of actors in civil society. The risk is, however, that by acting "in
the state," civil society actors may lose their critical edge. This bind that
collective actors find themselves in has long been identified by social movement
scholars:
[Institutional participation ... is a double edged sword. Social movements
that are too alienated from institutions risk isolation and sectarianism; but
those which collaborate too closely with institutions and take up
institutional routines can become imbued with their logic and values.
34
Therefore, from the perspective of a discourse approach, the challenge that
global networks face is how to straddle the two venues of deliberation
successfully, finding the optimal channels to influence policy outcomes while
being aware of the risks of co-option on the one hand and staying mindful of
the benefits that working within institutions can bring on the other.
International relations scholars have found evidence for discursive
construction of norms at the inter-state level (or the realm of "strong publics")
and have demonstrated how patterns of persuasive argumentation are found in
the adoption of international norms through an interaction among state officials,
involving mutual persuasion. Jeffery Checkel argued that state elites engage in
argumentative persuasion, defined as "an activity or process in which a
communicator attempts to induce a change in the belief, attitude, or behaviour
of another person . . . through the transmission of a message in a context in
which the persuadee has some degree of free choice."3 He demonstrated, for
example, how a pattern of constitutive compliance was found in the adoption of
the Council of Europe's citizenship rights norms in the Ukraine, through an
interaction of state officials with regional experts.36 Similarly, Thomas Risse,
drawing on studies of German unification, suggested that a process of social
learning is what brought Soviet leadership to agree to German unification within
NATO at the end of the Cold War. Soviet leaders were convinced by the
34 Sydney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics 208 (Cambridge 2d ed
1998).
35 Jeffrey T. Checkel, Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identiy Change, 55 Intl Org 553, 562
(2001) (citation omitted).
36 Id at 574-78.
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arguments made by German and US officials, through a process of "true
dialogue of mutual persuasion," among which was the legitimacy of the principle
of self-determination. 7  Other contributions have shown how advocacy
networks are also involved in the development and the entrenchment of
international norms through political action, often involving discursive
argumentation.38
Two concerns are often raised by critics of discursive approaches to global
governance. The first is that the idea of discursive argumentation is good in
theory, but it rarely takes place in practice.39 The inclusiveness requirement,
which instructs that all individuals or groups who may be affected by collective
decisions should be allowed to participate in the dialogue, is hardly ever met.
Admittedly, it is impossible for all members of a community to engage in such
dialogue over every issue that affects them. Yet for critical theorists, the
requirement of inclusiveness, as well as the other rules of argumentation, is not
absolute. The idea of discourse "is a regulative idea, a counterfactual stance from
which to assess and criticize nondeliberative processes and power politics."4 In
this sense, procedural fairness as required by a discourse approach-including
inclusiveness, equality, and openness to be persuaded-should be viewed as an
aspiration rather than as a goal that could be entirely achieved. The insight that
this approach provides, however, remains forceful nonetheless: the closer the
lawmaking process comes to reaching this regulative ideal, the more legitimate
the norms that it produces will be.
A second concern is that opening lawmaking fora to a multitude of
participants would compromise the effectiveness of the process. This claim rests
on the finding by some analysts that persuasion works better in insulated, in-
camera settings, where negotiators can freely exchange ideas and alter their
positions without worrying about the possible embarrassment involved in
retracting and publicly admitting that they were wrong.41 The implication is that
an inclusive process may not result in discursive argumentation on the part of
37 Risse, 54 Intl Org 1 at 23 (cited in note 24). For an extended discussion see Thomas Risse, The
Cold War's Endgame and German Uniflcation (A Review Essay), 21 Intl Security 159, 178-79 (1997).
38 For a comprehensive review of this literature, see Richard Price, Transnational Civil Soiety and
Advocafy in World Politics, 55 World Pol 579 (2003).
39 See Randall L. Schweller, Fantasy Theogy, 25 Rev Intl Stud 147, 147 (1999) (suggesting that
discursive approaches to international relations argue "by fiat rather than by the weight of hard
evidence, which is in scant supply here').
40 Ilan Kapoor, Deliberative Denocrat7 or Agonistic Pluralism? The Relevance of the Habermas-Mozffe Debate
for Third World Politics, 27 Alternatives 459, 462 (2002).
41 See Checkel, 55 Intl Org at 563 (cited in note 35). For a discussion of other conditions for
successful persuasion, see Alastair I. Johnston, Treating InternationalInstituions as Social Environments,
45 Intl Stud Q 487 (2001).
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state delegates because it would likely be tainted with rhetoric, demagoguery, and
overbidding. There is often a necessary trade-off, then, "between public reason
and public reason.
'4 2
But there is some evidence to suggest that at least in some areas of global
governance an inclusive process also produces more effective outcomes.
Reviewing a series of case studies on arguing and bargaining in multilateral
negotiations, Ulbert and Risse conclude that public settings are more conducive
to effective arguing when the debaters are uncertain about the preferences of
their constituents and when the consent of their constituents is required.43 In
such instances, a "two-level" arguing and persuasion process can be observed
with negotiators having to justify their positions twice: at the negotiating table
and in front of their domestic audiences." These findings suggest that in issue
areas that involve scientific uncertainty and that require domestic
implementation involving a multitude of actors, as environmental matters often
do, a more transparent and inclusive dialogue would also be more effective.
Further empirical research is needed in order to clarify under what conditions
shielding debate from the public improves its discursive quality and whether in
balance the loss of the legitimation effect is worthwhile.
The following discussion is much more modest in scope, however. It
examines one area of global environmental governance where a discourse
approach to democratic legitimacy arguably finds confirmation. Through an
examination of the active involvement of global networks in the law and politics
of climate change, this Article demonstrates how instrumental these actors were
in initiating and bringing about normative change by discursive means.
Furthermore, it suggests that network actors not only shape, but also may be
shaped by, the process of discursive argumentation.
III. GLOBAL NETWORKS IN ACTION: DEBATING
CLIMATE CHANGE
The climate change negotiations have been at the forefront of attempts to
open up international institutions to civil society input.45 The influence of both
ENGO and BINGO networks on the negotiations was made possible because
of the relatively open approach taken by the international community towards
42 Simone Chambers, Measuring Publidy's Effect: Reconciling Empirical Research and Normative Theory, 40
Acta Politica 255, 263 (2005).
43 Cornelia Ulbert and Thomas Risse, Deliberately Changing the Discourse: What Does Make Aguing
Effective?, 40 Acta Politica 351, 357-59 (2005).
44 Thomas Risse, Global Governance and Communicative Action, 39 Govt & Opposition 288, 312 (2004).
45 See Alkoby, 3 Non-State Actors & Intl L at 36-41 (cited in note 6). See generally Peter Newe,
Climate for Change: Non-State Actors and the Global Politics of the Greenhouse (Cambridge 2000).
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their participation. This approach is reflected in the text on the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change ("UNFCCC"),46 which addresses
the role of NGOs in Articles 4.1 (i), 7.2(1), and 7.6. These provisions establish the
rules for admission of NGOs to the proceedings as "observers," recognize the
importance of NGOs for public awareness of climate change, and state that the
Conference of the Parties ("COP") shall utilize their services and cooperation in
the supervision of the implementation of the UNFCCC.
The UNFCCC established the ultimate objective of the regime-the
stabilization of the concentration of greenhouse gas ("GHG") emissions in the
atmosphere to the levels that would help avoid the adverse impact of climate
change on humans and the environment. It also provided the institutional and
procedural framework within which this goal is to be achieved. In the five years
that followed, parties to the UNFCCC met annually in an attempt to reach an
agreement on a set of more specific, binding commitments to limit and to
reduce GHG emissions. A pact was finally reached at the Third Conference of
the Parties in 1997, when the Kyoto Protocol was signed.4' The Protocol
requires developed ("Annex I") countries to reduce their emissions of six GHGs
in accordance with country-by-country targets, which will reduce their combined
emissions by an average of 5.2 percent below 1990 levels at the end of the
Protocol's first commitment period (2008-2012).4" Global networks, it is argued
below, played a key role in the deliberations leading to the conclusion of this
ambitious treaty.
A. THE INVOLVEMENT OF ENGO NETWORKS IN THE
CLIMATE DEBATE
Some of the most influential environmental groups in the climate change
negotiations were ENGOs such as the World Wildlife Fund, Greenpeace, the
Sierra Club, Ozone Action, and the World Watch Institute. But most ENGOs
coordinated their activities under the umbrella of the Climate Action Network
("CAN")-a group of ENGOs with over 280 members. These NGOs were
given limited access to deliberation fora. The procedural rules allowed for mainly
two forms of formal participation by NGO observers: oral interventions and
written submissions.49 Observers were allowed to attend sessions of the COP
46 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992), 1771 UN Treaty Ser 107.
47 Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (1997), 37 ILM 22 (1998)
("Protocol").
48 Id, art 3.1.
49 UNFCCC, Draft Rules of Procedure of the COP and its Subsidiary Bodies to the UNFCCC, art 7(2)(1),
UN Doc FCCC/CP/1996/2 (1996). Rule 7.2 states that observers may, "upon invitation of the
president, participate without the right to vote in the proceedings of any session in matter of
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and its Subsidiary Bodies, and an informal practice developed whereby
representatives of NGO "constituencies" were allowed to make oral statements
during the sessions.50 NGOs also submitted documents directly to state
delegates, who found them particularly useful.5 ' During the Kyoto negotiations,
however, representatives of CAN were only initially allowed to attend the
sessions and deliver formal statements during the meetings. As deliberations
advanced, delegates tended to meet in closed-door sessions to which NGOs
were not admitted. NGOs then had to use informal means of influence,
attempting to lobby their cause by catching delegates in the corridors between
sessions, and, in some cases, "even searched trashcans and copiers in hopes of
retrieving draft documents. 52 Another indirect channel of influence was
involvement as participants or advisors of state delegations. The Center for
International Environmental Law, for example, in coordination with
Greenpeace, helped form and coordinate the positions of the Alliance of Small
Island States-a group of countries expected to suffer most from rising sea
levels as a result of global warming. The ability of this group of thirty-seven
states to influence policy outcomes was greatly enhanced by NGO contributions
to their position papers and interventions, because these developing countries
were typically represented by very small delegations which did not possess the
kind of expertise and knowledge that were available to other state participants.53
Throughout the negotiations, ENGOs used two valuable sources of
leverage in order to influence policy outcomes. The first was their expertise and
specialized knowledge on issues such as carbon sinks and emissions trading,
which state delegates found useful when debating different policy options.54 The
second was their link to public opinion through use of various media. One of
direct concern to the body or agency they represent, unless at least one third of the Parties at the
session object." As applied in practice, this Rule was understood to define what observers cannot
do (vote), and consequently their participation included access to deliberation venues, oral
interventions during the hearings, and distributions of documents to state delegations. See
Sebastian Oberthiir, et al, Particpation of Non-Governmental Oqganisalions in International Environmental
Governance: Legal Basis and Practical Experience 128-29 (Ecologic & FIELD 2002).
50 Most NGOs did not find these to be particularly useful, Oberthiir and his colleagues report, and
preferred to make spontaneous interventions during the substantive debate-which were only
rarely allowed. Id at 131-32.
51 Id at 132-33.
52 Eisabeth Corell and Michele M. Betsill, A Comparative Look at NGO Influence in International
EnvironmentalNegotiations: Deserefication and Climate Change, 1 Global Envir Pol 86, 95 (2001).
53 Peter Spiro, Non-governmental OrganiZations and Civil Socieo, in Bodansky, Brunne, and Hey, eds,
Handbook 770, 783 (cited in note 7). The Center for International Environmental Law has since
been renamed the Foundation for International Environmental Law ("FIELD").
54 Chiara Giorgetti, From Rio to Kyoto: A Study of the Involvement of Non-Governmental OrganiZations in the
Negotiaions on Climate Change, 7 NYU Envir L J 201, 238-243 (1999).
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the powerful instruments that ENGOs used during the negotiations leading to
signing of the Protocol was the online publication of the daily newsletters ECO
and the Earth Negotiations Bulletin. These publications served as important sources
of information on the deliberations, revealing the current state of the negotiating
process as well as helping to clarify the obscure language of international
diplomacy to the public.55
B. THE INVOLVEMENT OF BINGO NETWORKS IN THE
CLIMATE DEBATE
The more innovative feature of nonstate actors' involvement in the climate
debate is the appearance of relatively new players in the international
environmental arena: business entities, which will be directly affected by the
regulation of climate change mitigation policies. The business sector had
significant influence on the negotiation process leading to Kyoto. At times,
BINGOs outnumbered ENGOs at the conferences of the parties.56 While only
nonprofit entities are allowed to participate in the proceedings under the
UNFCCC, business associations are not considered profit-making entities but
groups working to advance the political interests of their constituents, and
therefore may be accredited as observers in the same ways as ENGOs.57
The profit-making criterion in itself should not serve as the gatekeeper, if
only because the assumption that for-profit entities are necessarily anti-
environment is false.58 Ever since the climate debate gained momentum, one can
observe a diversity of views held by different segments of the private sector. The
business community was divided into "grey" industry groups, which were
concerned with the economic impacts of the forming agreement, and the "light
55 ECO is published by CAN and is available online at <http://www.climatenetwork.org> (visited
Nov 17, 2007). The Earth Negotiations Bulletin is published by the International Institute on
Sustainable Development and is available online at <http://www.iisd.ca> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
56 Giorgetti, 7 NYU Envir LJ 201 at 220 (cited in note 54).
57 The wording of the permitting provision in Article 7(2)(l) of the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change, for example, does not exclude the possibility of allowing business corporations
into the process. It refers to "non-governmental bodies," and since this term has no exclusive
definition in the Convention, theoretically it could also include business corporations (cited in
note 46). However, the Note by the Secretariat: Admission of Observers: Inter governmental and
Nongovernmental OrganiZations, states that in preparing the list of eligible NGOs, "the secretariat has
taken due account of the provisions of Article 7, paragraph 6, of the Convention and of the
established practice whereby nongovernmental organizations are required to furnish proof of
their nonprofit (tax-exempt) status in a State Member of the United Nations." Organizational
Matters: Admission of Oqanizations as Observers, UNFCCC, 6th Sess, Provisional Agenda Item 2(e) at
2, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2000/2 (2000).
58 For an extended discussion of the inclusion of corporate actors in a discursive framework, see
Alkoby, Globalising a Green CivilSocieoy at 134-39 (cited in note 22).
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green" groups, representing renewable energies, cogeneration, natural gas and
other energy efficient industries which were expecting to benefit from a
regulatory change.59 The insurance sector, on the other hand, expects to suffer
major financial losses in a changing climate, and most insurance companies
favored an international agreement from the outset.
60
Still, the dominant actor within the BINGO network in the negotiations
until 1997 was the hard-line Global Climate Coalition ("GCC'", representing
companies and industry associations that were major producers and users of
fossil fuels. This coalition opposed any binding restrictions on GHG emissions,
questioning the scientific basis for concerns about anthropogenic global
warming and arguing that any attempts to cut down emissions would be
devastating to industrial states' economies.6 Other active BINGOs were the
International Chamber of Commerce, the World Business Council for
Sustainable Development, and the International Emissions Trading Association.
Their strategies for influencing the international negotiations were similar to
those of ENGOs: attending sessions as observers, making submissions when
possible, and offering assistance to policymakers. When formal participation
became more limited, they, too, had to resort to informal means of influence
such as lobbying and working through like-minded state delegations. The GCC,
for example, reportedly advised the Saudi Arabian, Kuwaiti, and Russian
governments for the purpose of obstructing deliberations.62
Most observers agree that NGO networks-both environmental and
business-played a crucial role in the Kyoto negotiations. The agreement
adopted was a compromise reflecting the push and pull from both sides: an
internationally binding agreement to curb greenhouse gas emissions was indeed
reached, but the final text did not fully reflect the stated goals of ENGOs, and
commitments were not as stringent as they had hoped.63 Overall, however,
considering the dominance of the oil industry in the negotiations, the failure of
the oil multinationals to thwart the reaching of an agreement seems puzzling.
Backed by politically and financially powerful corporate actors, BINGOs had
every chance to win the battle with ENGOs over the outcomes of the COP
59 See Sebastian Oberthiir and Hermann Ott, The Koto Protocol. International Climate Poh'g for the 21st
Centuy 31 (Springer 1999).
60 Matthew Paterson, Risky Business: Insurance Companies in Global Warming Politics, 1 Global Envir Pol
18, 20-23 (2001).
61 David E. Levy, Business and the Evolution of the Climate Regime: The Dynamics of Corporate Strategies, in
David E. Levy and Peter J. Newell, eds, The Business of Global Environmental Governance 73, 82-83
(MIT 2005).
62 Stephen Tully, Commerial Conttibutions to the Climate Change Regime: Who's Regulating Whom?, 5
Sustainable Dev L & Poly 14, 16 (2005).
63 Corell and Betsill, 1 Global Envir Pol at 96-97 (cited in note 52).
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rounds. What is even more puzzling is the apparent shift in the oil industry's
own stance on climate change since the conclusion of the Kyoto Protocol, even
after the US had renounced the Protocol in 2001 and made the chances for its
successful implementation dimmer than ever. Companies began to accept the
scientific basis for curbing GHG emissions and to invest in low emission
technologies. One plausible explanation for this change, this Article suggests, lies
in the discursive qualities of the climate debate, both inside and outside
institutional frameworks.
C. GLOBAL NETWORKS IN THE KYOTO PROCESS: DISCOURSE
APPROACH APPLIED
As critical theorists have suggested, global networks are not simply vehicles
for influencing policy outcomes. They also serve as sites of cultural and political
negotiation. They do not merely serve as diffusers of ideas and shared
understandings; these ideas are articulated, formulated, and often transformed
inside the network (in the "public sphere") and then advocated through its
political activity. International norms, under this view, are likely to attain a high
level of legitimacy when they are filtered through this transnational deliberative
process, which may also serve as an equalizing force in global social relations.
The relative success of ENGO networks in identifying and publicizing the
problem of climate change, developing policy-relevant knowledge, and
effectively transmitting this knowledge into the institutional debates was derived
from their ability to coordinate their efforts through internal dialogue. During
the negotiations, lead campaigners from each member of CAN attended all
conferences and met daily in order to agree on policy tactics. 6 4 The network
succeeded in organizing consensus despite the internal conflicts between
members, particularly between Northern and Southern ENGOs, with their
respective emphasis on environmental versus equity implications of global
warming.65 The CAN's unwritten code of conduct "prescribes the inclusion of
developing country NGO views., 66 This requirement often uncovers deep
conflicts, but through continuous dialogue members of CAN have managed to
translate the differences of opinion into comparative advantages and areas of
expertise:
[N]orthern NGOs have often reviewed their positions (on forestry,
agriculture and population in particular) after discussion with partners from
64 Simone Pulver, Organising Business: Indushy NGOs in the Climate Debates, 39 Greener Mgmt Intl 55,
60 (2002).
65 Id.
66 Matthias Duwe, The Climate Action Network: A Glance behind the Curtains of a Transnational NGO
Network, 10 RECIEL 177, 180 (2001).
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the South who draw their attention to new dimensions of environmental
problems (consumption per capita, poverty, etc.). In parallel, southern
NGOs have been working on those issues, which used to be considered
exclusively northern. 67
Reconciling the differences between the northern and southern members
of CAN is an ongoing challenge, and a recent study reveals that in the past few
years, "the initial impetus for balanced cooperation may have been lost to some
extent to the routine of the process., 68 Powerful actors within CAN have
alienated others, and the growing complexity of the Kyoto process makes it
difficult to negotiate a long-term vision of the regime internally. Nonetheless,
the level of continued cooperation reached so far is impressive.69
ENGOs also disagreed on the use of market-based mechanisms, such as
emissions trading, as part of the regulatory framework's formation. European
ENGOs believed that such mechanisms would compromise the environmental
integrity of the Protocol because it would allow some states to avoid taking any
meaningful action to curb their GHG emissions, while American ENGOs were
strong advocates of emissions trading based on the successful US experience in
trading schemes.7" Despite the ongoing disagreement among network members,
the CAN managed to present a unified front, which made its input into the
policy process coherent and effective. When consensus was not reached at the
network level, members in disagreement with CAN's position could still offer
their input into the institutional deliberation since each member of the network
could also be accredited to the UNFCCC independently as observer. This ability
to work both with and independently of the network had an equalizing effect on
the intra-network dialogue because it limits the incentive of each member to try
to control the network.7 '
The business network, on the other hand, was not able to organize a
similar consensus for several reasons. First, the challenge of reaching consensus
was far greater to begin with, given the wide divergence of business perspectives
on climate change. From the initial phase of the negotiations, there was no
umbrella organization similar to CAN that represented all segments of the
private sector, because industries were deeply divided between companies that
saw climate change as a business opportunity and others that saw it as a liability.
Second, the access of business entities to the policy process was more
limited than that of the environmental groups. Given the UNFCCC's nonprofit
67 Id at 181 (quoting from CAN website).
68 Id at 189.
69 Id.
70 Pulver, 39 Greener Mgmt Ind at 60-61 (cited in note 64).
71 Id at 64.
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accreditation criteria for NGOs, a company that was a member of a business
association could not register under its own name as an observer in the
negotiations. 'Therefore, any input into the policy process had to be made
through BINGOs.72 When consensus could not be reached at the BINGO level,
internal conflicts were difficult to resolve and divergent views could not be
otherwise accommodated. Disagreeing members' only option was to join a
different BINGO or form a new association through which to influence the
negotiations. The GCC, for example, represented 40 percent of the US
economy, dominated by oil industry members such as Exxon, Mobil, Chevron,
and Texaco.73 While two major European multinationals, BP and Shell,
attempted to coordinate efforts with the GCC at the early stages of the
negotiations, they parted ways because of their inability to reach a consensus on
policy issues.74 Close to the signing of the Protocol, BP and Shell publicly
accepted the science of climate change and expressed their support for global
climate regulation. These companies' only recourse was to form the World
Business Council for Sustainable Development, through which to exert their
influence on the lawmaking process. The GCC experienced a number of
additional defections of members during the late 1990s, and by 2002 the GCC
had disbanded and withdrawn from the climate debate altogether.75
The third crucial difference between the business networks' activity and
that of the environmental networks concerns their methods of engagement with
the institutional deliberation fora. While ENGOs perceived themselves as
participants in the international political debate, many of the BINGOs,
particularly those based in the US, maintained an oppositional stance toward the
international political authorities. The GCC's style of lobbying was an extension
of an American model of political engagement, encouraging the view that
"regulation is the product of ongoing conflict between interest groups, and
business wields influence through the action of lobbying groups in Washington,
D.C."76 In the language of discourse theorists, members of the GCC refused to
accept one of the basic rules of discursive argumentation-an openness to be
persuaded by the better argument. Their adversarial style of network activity did
not fit well with the international institutional setting, where a discursive model
72 Id at 58-60, 65.
73 Id at 61.
74 Id at 63-64.
75 Levy, Business and the Evolution of the Climate Regime at 91-92 (cited in note 61). See also Lester R.
Brown, Issue Alert, The Rise and Fall of the Global Climate Coalition (Worldwatch Inst July 25, 2001).
76 Pulver, 39 Greener Mgmt Intl at 63-64 (cited in note 64). For an analysis of different corporate
strategies as a function of the domestic political culture (uxtaposing ExxonMobil and American
culture with Shell and Dutch culture), see Jon Birger Skaerseth and Tora Skodvin, Climate Change
and the Oil Industy: Common Problems, Different Strategies, 1 Global Envir Pol 43 (2001).
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of lawmaking was being developed as a result of the relatively inclusive
framework. Other companies, however, were more influenced by the European
political model of a business's relationship with the government, which "relies
on a more consultative process based on a clear division of responsibilities.""7
European-based BINGOs thus preferred to pursue a more collaborative process
with other participants in the institutional debate, both ENGOs and states.78 BP
and Shell, for example, rejected the aggressive lobbying tactics of the GCC and
distanced themselves from this network for that reason.7' Arguably, then,
business associations that accepted the discursive method of engagement, and
perceived themselves as full participants in the climate debate (rather than as
adversaries or information providers only), were more successful in channeling
their input into the policy process.8° Others, like the GCC, were eventually
filtered out of the debate and dissipated.
The foregoing suggests that effective discourse within networks, as well as
between networks and international institutions, produces the kind of lawmaking
that approximates the regulative ideal advanced by critical deliberative
democrats. The question remains, however: what convinced companies like BP
and Shell, which were initially opposed to any international climate regulation
limiting GHG emissions, to adopt a supportive policy? The institutional
deliberation and the broader discursive framework within which global networks
operate provide a partial explanation for this shift in corporate strategy.
Several analysts have explored the reasons for the shift of American
companies towards the acceptance of precautionary action and more
accommodative positions on emission controls.8 After defecting from the GCC,
77 Pulver, 39 Greener Mgmt Intl at 64 (cited in note 64).
78 They collaborated not only with state delegates but with ENGOs as well. The Business Council
for Sustainable Energy, the World Business Council on Sustainable Development, and the
International Climate Change Partnership teamed up with the World Resources Institute and
Environmental Defence to pursue research on profitable emission reductions. See generally Levy,
Business and the Evolution of the Climate Regime at 93 (cited in note 61).
79 Pulver, 39 Greener Mgmt Intl at 64 (cited in note 64).
80 Some analysts argue that the level of influence of ENGOs on the outcomes of the negotiations
was only "moderate" since the Protocol does not fully reflect the ENGOs' stated position at the
beginning of the process (higher emission reduction goals, strong review and compliance
mechanisms, and no market mechanisms such as emission trading). Corell and Betsill, 1 Global
Envir Pol at 96-97 (cited in note 52). When compared to the stated goals of forces opposing
international regulation of any sort, however, it is clear that ENGOs were more successful in
influencing the outcomes.
81 See generally Levy, Business and the Evolution of the Climate Regime (cited in note 61); Skaerseth and
Skodvin, 1 Global Envir Pol 43 (cited in note 76); Vicki Arroyo and Benjamin Preston, Change in
the Markeplace: Business Leadership and Communication, in Susanne C. Moser and Lisa Dilling, eds,
Creating a Climate for Change: Communicating Climate Change and Failtating Social Change 319
(Cambridge 2007).
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some of the member companies became affiliated with the Pew Center on
Global Climate Change and developed a joint statement that accepts the science
of climate change.82 The Pew Center has since worked with the companies in its
Business Environmental Leadership Council to develop voluntary climate-
related strategies intended to reduce GHG emissions despite the uncertainty
regarding future governmental regulation.83 These are not isolated cases;
numerous initiatives have been undertaken by private sector actors in
preparation for a carbon-constrained world.84 One catalyst for this activity is the
realization that reduction of GHG emissions also saves money by reducing costs
through savings in energy and materials consumption.8' This factor is only part
of the broader imperative of "ecological modernization" in which the climate
debate is embedded. Ecological modernization aims to achieve the goal of
environmental protection through the use of technological, organizational, and
financial resources of the private sector, through collaboration between
government agencies and business, and through the use of flexible market-based
implementation measures.86 The discourse of ecological modernization marks a
paradigm shift in the conceptualization of the business-environment-society
relationship. Business corporations are no longer seen only as part of the
problem of environmental degradation; they are part of the solution, crucial
partners in the quest for social and ecological sustainability. The Protocol and its
implementation through the use of market-based mechanisms is designed as a
positive-sum game for corporate actors and best reflects the "win-win" rhetoric
of the ecological modernization approach.87 The intense interactions within the
network and with the UNFCCC advanced the diffusion of this conceptual
82 These included American Electric Power, Boeing, BP, Amoco, LockheedMartin, Shell
International, Sunoco, Toyota, United Technologies, and Whirlpool. See Eileen Claussen,
Responding to Global Warming Problem: Climate Change, Present and Future, 27 Ecology L Q 1373,
1375-77 (2001).
83 For a detailed analysis of the climate change mitigation actions taken by these companies
(Cinergy, Swiss Re, DuPont, Alcoa, the Shell Group, and Whirlpool), see Andrew Hoffman,
Getting Ahead of the Curve: Corporate Strategies thatAddress Climate Change (Pew Center 2006).
84 For a review, see Levy, Business and the Evolution of the Climate Regime (cited in note 61).
85 Arroyo and Preston, Change in the Marketplace at 323-28 (cited in note 81).
86 Maarten A. Hajer, The Politics of Entironmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Polig Process
46 (Oxford 1996).
87 Levy, Business and the Evolution of the Cimate Regime at 93 (cited in note 61). For example, the
Protocol establishes in Article 17 the international emissions trading (IET) mechanism, which
involves trading of surplus GHG emissions, of countries that stay below their allowed emissions,
with countries that exceed their emission levels in the commitment period. This would allow the
parties involved in the transfers to achieve their GHG emission objectives while minimizing the
overall economic costs of reduction.
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framework so that international regulation was no longer seen as a liability but as
another business opportunity.
But what is perhaps more indicative of the change in the business sector's
participation in this discussion is the apparent acceptance of environmental
protection as a moral imperative in and of itself. Embedded in the emerging
movement of corporate social responsibility, the CEO's of multinationals in the
oil, manufacturing, and utility industries have adopted the rhetoric used until
recently only by environmentalists.88 They articulate personal concerns for the
future of the planet and have incorporated environmental considerations in their
internal policies, calling for early action on climate change. One study has found
that "doing the right thing" ranks very high in the list of primary motivations for
climate-related strategies, according to the managers of six major
multinationals.89 Cynics may doubt the seriousness of these statements and see
them as part of corporate actors' attempts at "greenwashing" their business. But
rhetoric, as Thomas Risse has demonstrated, can have a very powerful effect
even on self-interested actors.9 ° The rhetorical adoption of precepts, norms, and
ideas in response to external pressure often leads to the "self-entrapment' 1 of
the participant in the discourse. What starts as strategic adaptation to the
discursive framework ends with argumentative behavior resembling the criteria
for discursive argumentation defined above: inclusiveness, equality, and
openness to be persuaded.92 Accordingly, even if we assume that some corporate
actors currently do not "really believe" in the science of climate change and the
need for mitigation policies, their adoption of the climate change rhetoric is the
first step toward a genuine internalization of the shared understandings that the
climate debate has generated.
Yet the significance of the shift in the position of corporate actors in the
climate debate should not be overstated. The future of the regime also depends
on the broader discourse in which global networks are embedded, and its fate
will likely be determined by state actors involved in the Kyoto process. In this
regard, a recent partnership of like-minded states raises some serious concerns.
The United States, Australia, South Korea, China, and India formed the Asia-
Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate ("APP"); Canada
recently joined. It is described as "an innovative new effort to accelerate the
88 Arroyo and Preston, Change in the Markeplace at 332-33 (cited in note 81).
89 See Hoffman, Getling Ahead of the Curve at 21-22 (cited in note 83).
90 Risse, 54 Intl Org at 32-33 (cited in note 24).
91 Id at 32.
92 For a study confirming this hypothesis with regard to the adoption of human rights norms by
leaders of repressive regime, see Risse, et al, The Power of Human Rights (cited in note 5).
Vol. 8 No. 2
Global Networks and International Environmental Lawmaking
development and deployment of clean energy technologies."93 While this
initiative is presented as "consistent with" the UNFCCC and as
"complementary" to the Protocol,9 4 it is rightly viewed by critics as an attempt to
sideline Kyoto by pushing for an alternative "voluntary, non-legally binding"
framework." Interestingly, in three of the states involved, this strategic move
was accompanied by a change in rhetoric of the state leaders from denial of the
science of climate change to apparent acceptance (George W. Bush in the US,
John Howard in Australia, and Stephen Harper in Canada). While the change of
rhetoric may signal a first move toward the internalization of norms as discourse
theorists predict, the fact that this "self-entrapment" is also marked by their exit
from Kyoto's discursive framework may further slow down the disciplining
effect that institutional deliberation could exert on these actors. It remains to be
seen what effect this development will have on the successful implementation of
the Protocol and the negotiations toward the second phase of the Protocol after
2012.
IV. THE LEGITIMACY OF GLOBAL NETWORKS
The growing recognition of the political power that global networks have
recently gained raises the question of their accountability. There is general
agreement that nonstate actors involved in international lawmaking have a voice,
not a vote. But the idea that giving them a voice includes granting them access
to institutional deliberations is far from being accepted. The main objection
comes from those who claim that the sources of the legitimacy of NGOs are
complex and open to question. The discussion below offers a two-fold response
to such concerns. First, the assumption underlying the claim that NGOs are not
accountable is that, at least in democratic states, governments are accountable to
their citizens, and this fact makes them (the only) legitimate actors in the global
arena. As many commentators have shown, this assumption is far from accurate
because representative governments also suffer from a legitimacy deficit.
Second, the ontological shift in the conceptualization of democracy offered by
the discourse approach provides an even better argument in defense of NGOs.
93 See About the Asia-Pafic Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, available online at
<http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/About.htm> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
94 Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, Second Ministerial Meeting, New
Delhi, India, Communiqui (Oct 15 2007), available at <http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/
DelhiCommunique.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
95 See Sierra Club Canada, Backgrounder on the Asia Pacific Partnership, October 2007, available online at
<http://www.climateactionnetwork.ca/e/resources/publications/member/asia-pacific-
partnership-info.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007). The six original members refused to ratify the
Protocol, and Canada joined this initiative after having ratified the Protocol, thereby signaling a
future renunciation of the agreement.
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True, these groups are not particularly representative, but that does not mean
that they lack legitimacy: their legitimacy derives from the discursive qualities
they bring to the debate.
A. THE CRITICS OF GLOBAL NETWORKS
Critics of NGOs often argue that NGOs lack accountability because no
one entrusted them with the power they wield, yet they claim to represent the
world's public. While their actions often affect the entire world's public, NGOs
remain responsible to no one.96 Kenneth Anderson, perhaps the most astute of
these critics, identifies the political roots of the recent hostility against
international NGOs as coming particularly from American conservatives.9"
"[S]trong conservatives," he writes, express the concern that international
NGOs, most of whom hold a liberal progressive agenda, see international law as
a means to achieve results that have been rejected by national democratic
political processes.98 On the other hand, "pragmatic conservative[s]," with whom
Anderson takes issue, are beginning to look for ways to work with NGOs,
realizing that NGOs are here to stay. They seek "to use them as providers of
services, to take advantage of their expertise and networks, to find common
ground with them on pressuring recalcitrant countries on issues such as human
rights and sometimes even the environment, and to obtain their support for
administration policies where possible."99
This acceptance of global civil society actors is based on the assumption
that international NGOs are the genuine equivalent of domestic NGOs in
democratic societies. This assumption, Anderson contends, is deeply flawed
because international NGOs operate in an entirely different structure and
environment from the domestic ones. In democratic states, NGOs represent
only themselves and are thus accountable to no one-"nor should they be,
because the function of democratic accountability is accomplished by a wholly
different mechanism: elections."' 100 In an international system that suffers from a
democratic deficit, civil society actors offer themselves as "substitutes for
96 See Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of International Non-
Governmental Organigaions and the Idea of International Civil Society, 11 Eur J Ind L 91, 112-19 (2000).
See also Jeremy Rabkin, International Law vs. the American Constitution-Something's Got to Give, Nad
Interest 30, 37 (Spring 1999).
97 See Kenneth Anderson, The limits of Pragmatism in American Foreign Poligy: Unsolicted Advice to the
Bush Administration on Relations with International Nongovernmental OTganiZaions, 2 Chi J Intl L 371
(2001).
98 Id at 372-74.
99 Id at 375.
100 Id at 382.
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democracy," especially in international institutions that are developing a
dangerous symbiosis with these voluntary groups. That is, international
institutions increasingly accept NGOs as legitimate international actors and
NGOs, in turn, confer legitimacy on these international institutions because they
provide them with the policies that national governments often do not. For their
role in the continued erosion of state sovereignty, Anderson concludes, NGOs
ought to be regarded not only as "undemocratic" but even "antidemocratic."''
1
B. IN DEFENSE OF GLOBAL NETWORKS
Anderson's line of argument shows precisely why a discourse approach to
conceptualizing the role of global networks is superior to conventional
approaches. The conservative case against NGOs puts too much trust in the
workings of accountability mechanisms in democratic countries. The interest
group liberalism that Anderson endorses is problematic for many reasons that
democratic theorists have highlighted for years.0 2 Reclaiming state sovereignty
by excluding NGOs from participating in international lawmaking, therefore,
would not solve the internal legitimacy deficit from which representative
democracies will continue to suffer. Either way, "franchise itself is a crude tool
for keeping governmental authorities in line."1°3 So to argue that NGOs lack
accountability while states enjoy it is far from accurate.
Under a discourse approach, NGOs are a part of a democratizing force,
not because they represent the people of the world in any aggregative sense, but
because global civil society is a venue for the pursuit of discursive democracy.
Most of the time, the democratic advances these networks of nonstate actors
offer are sought in the public sphere, but they are also sought in the institutional
sphere. Using representativeness criteria for admitting NGOs to the political
debate (by asking "who do NGOs represent" or "who elected the NGOs"?' 4) is
an absurdity, since the level of representation says very little about the legitimacy
of the group or the organization which speaks on its behalf. Even organizations
who seek to promote the most hateful and destructive ideas could be
101 Id at 383.
102 The attack on the representative model of democracy has not only been pressed by deliberative
democrats. The social choice critique is one example. See Dryzek, Deliberaive Democray at ch 2
(cited in note 19). Social choice theorists argue that any system of preference aggregation is
inherently arbitrary. In its extreme version, this theory holds that "there is no point in any
individual voting for what is in his or her personal interest. Instead, the individual win vote for
what is in his or her 'expressive' preferences, the social values he or she would like to stand for."
Id at 34. For a discussion of other critical voices, see Paul Wapner, Defending Accountabiliy in
NGOs, 3 ChiJ Ind L 197, 198-99 (2002).
103 Peter J. Spiro, Accouningfor NGOs, 3 Chi J Ind L 161, 164 (2002).
104 Anderson, 2 Chi J Intl L at 379 (quoting David Rieft) (cited in note 97).
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representing a broad constituency, which surely does not make them more
legitimate than less representative groups.
NGOs are held accountable differently, and sometimes more effectively,
than states because their actions are monitored more directly through internal
accountability.' NGOs are accountable to their members, who hold the right of
exit from the organization and who can "also vote with their pocketbooks." ' 6
NGOs must satisfy their members in order to garner continued support.
Externally, it is argued that the networks, within which NGOs often work, may
serve as checks on abuse of power.1 7 In this sense, NGOs are also accountable
to each other. In many ways, at least environmental NGOs are accountable to a
much wider public because of their need to maintain a good reputation. Unlike
state actors, who may occasionally betray the public trust without suffering any
consequences, the stakes for NGOs are very high: "the only thing they have
going for them is their reputation, and this rests on credibility."'08
Furthermore, NGOs are held accountable not only internally but toward
international institutions. Some institutions (such as the UNFCCC) make
arrangements for NGO participation by establishing accreditation criteria. These
arrangements are usually devised to verify that the participants are "qualified" in
the relevant field, and the need to employ such gatekeepers is understandable.0 9
Peter Spiro, a friendly critic of NGOs, goes further to suggest a formal inclusion
of NGOs in international institutions in order to increase their external
accountability. He is in favor of granting them formal access rights precisely for
the purpose of attaching responsibilities to them as well. But the picture of
NGO responsibility that Spiro paints begins to look like a dangerous scenario of
co-option with the institutions of the state alluded to above."0 Once the status
of NGOs becomes more formal, Spiro argues, it would be possible to constrain
their political activities in ways that may enhance their accountability:
No longer could NGOs opt out of bargains to which they had attached
their names. As ongoing institutional participants, they would have a greater
incentive to facilitate institutional success. Advocacy groups would no
105 See Wapner, 3 Chi J Ind L (cited in note 102). See also my discussion in Alkoby, 3 Non-State
Actors & Intl L at 45-47 (cited in note 6).
106 Wapner, 3 Chi J Intl L at 201 (cited in note 102).
107 Id at 202. This is what Grant and Keohane term the "peer accountability" mechanism. Ruth
Grant and Robert 0. Keohane, Accountability andAbuses in World Poliics, 99 Am Pol Sci Rev 29, 37
(2005).
108 Wapner, 3 Chi J Intl L at 203-04 (cited in note 102). See also Grant and Keohane, 99 Am Pol Sci
Rev at 37 (cited in note 107) (discussing "public reputational accountability").
109 UNFCCC, art 7.6.
110 See text accompanying note 34.
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longer be able to launder their influence through pliant front-states or
backroom lobbying."'
This is the same symbiosis, or "powerful romantic embrace,""' 2 between global
institutions and NGOs that Anderson describes in less favorable terms; the idea
that a pragmatic conservative would prefer to bring in the "sometimes noisy,
sometimes rude, sometimes crazy equivalent of domestic civil society" in order
to contain their "wilder impulses.""' 3 The implication is that NGOs can be made
accountable only at the cost of entrapping them in political arrangements that
they helped design. But to limit the ability of NGOs to revisit these
arrangements and to criticize them when necessary could mean bad news for
democracy. What needs to be ensured is that civil society groups will maintain
their independence and avoid becoming imbued with the institution's logic, and
that can only be done if their ability to stand in opposition to the institution and
to challenge it when necessary remains a strategic option. The transformative
potential that NGOs have lies precisely in their ability to continuously
reconsider the political consensus when it no longer reflects the needs of
individuals in the public sphere.
A recent report by the UN Panel of Eminent Persons ("Panel") rightly
takes a more careful approach to external accountability than the one advocated
by Spiro. The Panel has advised the UN to work with NGOs to determine
possible codes of conduct and self-policing mechanisms "to heighten disciplines
of quality, governance, and balance." ' 1 4 It proposes accreditation criteria for
NGOs that will be based on technical merit (their expertise in the relevant area,
their professional qualifications, their internal governance structure) and urges
the UN to depoliticize the admission process by establishing clear, merit-based
rules in order to avoid the arbitrariness of the current selection process." 5 Most
importantly, it is recognized in the report that the main contribution of civil
society groups to global governance is in the diversity of viewpoints that they
bring into the institutional deliberative process, rather than the number of
111 Spiro, 3 Chi J Intl L at 167 (cited in note 103).
112 Anderson, 2 ChiJ Intl L at 381 (cited in note 97).
113 Id at 376.
114 Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations, We the Peoples: Civil Sociey,
the United Nations and Global Governance, UN Doc A/58/817 at 59 (2004).
115 Id at 53-54 (emphasizing this point in articles 124 and 127). A reminder for the political bias of
the selection process was given last year when the United States backed an Iranian initiative to
deny consultative status in the UN's ECOSOC to organizations working to protect the rights of
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people. See Human Rights Watch, United Nations:
U.S. Aligned with Iran in Anti-Gay Vote: Rice MAust Explain Repressive UN Ban on LGBT R'ghts Groups,
(Jan 25, 2006), available online at <http://vww.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/25/
iran12535.htm> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
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people that they represent. The UN is thus advised to open up to as many civil
society groups as possible and to "resist hand-picking civil society organization
actors, especially for deliberative processes." While grouping NGOs together
may be required for the efficiency of deliberation (and the network form, as we
have seen, is a successful example for such grouping), the UN should "offer
incentives for aggregation, without requiring it.""
6
Similarly, under a discourse approach, the major accountability mechanism
of participants is the deliberative process itself, from which bad arguments
eventually get filtered out. The demise of the GCC nicely illustrates this
function. As shown above, the fall of the GCC can be partly explained by its
inability to reach an internal consensus and its unwillingness to engage in
genuine dialogue with the institutional authorities (perceiving them as
adversaries rather than equal participants). This mechanism is supported by the
"peer" and the "reputational" accountability: bad performance can reflect on the
credibility of a group in the public sphere as well as in the institutional debate,
just like with the GCC. In other words, "[o]rganizations that are poorly rated by
their peers are likely to have difficulty in persuading them to cooperate and,
therefore, to have trouble achieving their own purposes.
'' u7
The challenge, therefore, from an institutional design perspective, is how to
devise deliberative processes that would encourage a genuine dialogue between
and among state and nonstate parties, where the communicative appeal of the
ideas that they each seek to advance can be tested. Part of this challenge is to
ensure that all civil society groups interested in providing their input will have a
fair opportunity to do so. Observers of ENGO participation in global relations,
for example, appear to agree that political civil society actors are
disproportionately middle-aged, professional, relatively wealthy, urban, Christian,
white males from Northern countries." 8 The most vulnerable groups of global
civil society are underrepresented in global governance institutions because they
lack the resources and expertise to participate. Some have suggested addressing
this imbalance by establishing "Civil Society Chambers"-an assembly of sorts
through which NGO input will be channeled into international decisionmaking.
In these chambers, it would be possible to ensure geographically balanced
116 Panel of Eminent Persons, We the Peoples at 59 (cited in note 114). Interestingly, the Panel has
found that there have been "very few occasions of crowding---either in debating time or in
seating." Id at 58. So the claim that the vast number of NGOs makes participation impractical
may not be a real concern, at least not yet.
117 Grant and Keohane, 99 Am Pol Sci Rev at 37 (cited in note 107). See also Panel of Eminent
Persons, We the Peoples at 59, art 141 (cited in note 114).
118 Jan Aart Scholte, Civil Sodey and Democray in Global Governance, 8 Global Governance 281, 296
(2002); Sebastian Oberthiir, et al, Partidpation of Non-Governmental at 238 (cited in note 49). See also
Panel of Eminent Persons, We the Peoples at 59, 65 (cited in note 114).
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representation of various civil society groups."9 But a direct involvement of
governments in the selection process to such chambers again would raise
concerns regarding political bias. Namely, it may compromise their ability to
maintain an oppositional stance toward the state delegates who elected them. 2'
The Panel of Eminent Persons adopts a more flexible approach and recognizes
that the UN may only provide improved conditions for increased involvement
of Southern NGOs in its operation, not dictate it. The Secretary-General is
called upon to "enlist donor support for enhancing the capacity of the United
Nations to identify and work with local actors, establishing a fund to build
Southern civil society capacity to participate and ensuring that country-level
engagement feeds into the global deliberative processes."''
Overall, the recommendations made by the Panel of Eminent Persons seek
to ensure that a fine balance is maintained between the need to keep global civil
society free from government control and the responsibility of governments to
help it thrive. The possible pact between international institutions and civil
society groups is not understood as "access in exchange for your support," as
Kenneth Anderson's "pragmatic conservatives" would have it. The formula is
rather "access in exchange for your valuable contribution to institutional
deliberation." According to the Panel, civil society groups could help UN
institutions to be better informed, keep them in tune with global public opinion,
and enhance their legitimacy as a result.
122
V. CONCLUSION
Implementing the ideals of deliberative democracy has important
advantages, especially for environments characterized by a high level of cultural
pluralism, where there are enduring differences in the conceptions of the good.
Collective decisions in deliberative democracy are not made only through
aggregating pre-existing preferences of the members of the community, but
mainly through deliberation. The first, informally organized arena of deliberation
is the network, which is located within the public sphere ("weak publics").
Members of the network attempt to influence each other's opinion by engaging
119 Michael Edwards, NGO Rights and Responsibilifies: A New Dealfor Global Governance 32 (Foreign Poly
Ctr 2000).
120 See Oberthiir, et al, Particpalion of Non-Governmental Organisaions at 239 (cited in note 49).
121 Panel of Eminent Persons, We the Peoples at 65-66 (cited in note 114). Oberthilr and his colleagues
also suggest, with some reservations, establishing NGO Advisory Bodies and holding more
multilateral negotiations in developing countries in order to allow more local NGOs to
participate. Oberthiir, et a, Partidpaion of Non-Governmental Organisations at 239-40 (cited in note
49).
122 Panel of Eminent Persons, Wle the Peoples at 27 (cited in note 114).
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in a discourse in which they examine and critique the positions of others, while
explaining the reasons for their own views. The persuasive appeal of the better
argument, under this view, is the main legitimizing factor of collective decisions.
The second deliberative arena includes formally organized institutions of the
political system, where political will-formation takes place, or in other words,
where law is created ("strong publics"). While it is important to keep civil society
separate from and independent of the political system, the interaction between
the two publics, the "weak" and the "strong," can sometimes be genuinely
deliberative. This Article has argued that this conceptual framework is useful in
making sense of the relative success of the climate change negotiations and for
understanding the centrality of ENGO and BINGO networks in the formation
of the regime.
While the relatively inclusive approach to network input taken by the
UNFCCC resulted in a framework that has made significant strides toward the
regulative ideal of discourse, it is still far from fully conforming to it. One
difficulty identified above is the artificial distinction in the UNFCCC
nongovernmental organization admission criteria between for-profit entities
(who may not be admitted) and associations of for-profit entities (who may be
allowed in as observers). Corporate actors' inability to influence the policy
process directly was one of the factors leading to a destabilization of the
business network because it affected its ability to reach a reasoned consensus
among its members.'23 Allowing private companies to register directly as
observers may have the same equalizing effect it had on the ENGO network, by
emphasizing the voluntary basis of participation in the network and its
nonhierarchical nature. Members then participate not because they must act
through the network, since they would have an easy alternative to voice their
arguments independently of the network, but because they truly want to
deliberate in order to reach a consensus. If consensus is not reached at the
network level, this increased flexibility of corporate participation would still
benefit the institutional deliberative process by broadening the range of business
perspectives considered in the negotiations.
Moreover, discourse does not end with the conclusion of the negotiations
and the adoption of legal instruments. The successful implementation of norms
is also part of the lawmaking endeavor, and it depends on the discursive qualities
of the process. So far, state parties to the UNFCCC have chosen not to extend
the involvement of nonstate actors beyond the treaty-making stage and to allow
them, for example, to get involved in the Non-Compliance Procedure under the
UNFCCC' 24 While the overall approach to resolving disputes relating to
123 Pulver, 39 Greener Mgmt Intl at 58-59, 66 (cited in note 64).
124 See the discussion in Alkoby, 3 Non-State Actors & Intl L at 40-41 (cited in note 6).
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noncompliance with the treaty is facilitative rather than adversarial-and for that
it may exhibit distinctly discursive qualities- it is not envisioned by state parties
as particularly inclusive. Nonstate actors will not be permitted to file complaints
against violating states, or to submit questions of implementation to the
UNFCCC Compliance Committee. Only state parties may trigger the Non-
Compliance Procedure and debate the matter among themselves. Closing off
this institutional deliberative forum to the input of all affected actors may
compromise the legitimacy of the regime as it evolves in the future.
Winter 2008
Alko!y
CJIL
